Neutrino-based tools for nuclear verification and diplomacy in North
  Korea by Carr, Rachel et al.
Neutrino-based tools for nuclear verification
and diplomacy in North Korea
Rachel Carr1, Jonathon Coleman2, Mikhail Danilov3, Giorgio Gratta4, Karsten Heeger5,
Patrick Huber6, YuenKeung Hor7, Takeo Kawasaki8, Soo-Bong Kim9, Yeongduk Kim10,
John Learned11, Manfred Lindner12, Kyohei Nakajima13, James Nikkel5, Seon-Hee Seo14,
Fumihiko Suekane15, Antonin Vacheret16, Wei Wang7, James Wilhelmi17, and Liang Zhan18
1Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
77 Massachusetts Ave., 24-607, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139, United States;
recarr@mit.edu
2Department of Physics, University of Liverpool, Merseyside, United Kingdom
3P. N. Lebedev Physical Institute of RAS, Moscow, Russia
4Physics Department, Stanford University, Stanford, California, United States
5Wright Laboratory, Department of Physics, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut,
United States
6Center for Neutrino Physics, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, Virginia, United States
7School of Physics, Sun Yat-Sen University, Guangzhou, China
8Department of Physics, Kitasato University, Sagamihara, Japan
9Department of Physics, Seoul National University, Seoul, Korea
10Center for Underground Physics, Institute for Basic Science, Daejeon, Korea
11Department of Physics and Astronomy, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Honolulu,
Hawaii, United States
12Max-Planck Institute for Nuclear Physics, Heidelberg, Germany
13Graduate School of Engineering, University of Fukui, Fukui, Japan
14Center for Underground Physics, Institute for Basic Science, Daejeon, Korea
1
ar
X
iv
:1
81
1.
04
73
7v
2 
 [p
hy
sic
s.s
oc
-p
h]
  2
5 J
ul 
20
19
15Research Center for Neutrino Science, Tohoku University, Sendai, Japan
16Department of Physics, Imperial College London, London, United Kingdom
17Department of Physics, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, United States
18Institute of High Energy Physics, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
July 29, 2019
Abstract
We present neutrino-based options for verifying that the nuclear reactors at North Korea’s Yongbyon
Nuclear Research Center are no longer operating or that they are operating in an agreed manner, pre-
cluding weapons production. Neutrino detectors may be a mutually agreeable complement to traditional
verification protocols because they do not require access inside reactor buildings, could be installed col-
laboratively, and provide persistent and specific observations. At Yongbyon, neutrino detectors could
passively verify reactor shutdowns or monitor power levels and plutonium contents, all from outside
the reactor buildings. The monitoring options presented here build on recent successes in basic particle
physics. Following a dedicated design study, these tools could be deployed in as little as one year at
a reasonable cost. In North Korea, cooperative deployment of neutrino detectors could help redirect
a limited number of scientists and engineers from military applications to peaceful technical work in
an international community. Opportunities for scientific collaboration with South Korea are especially
strong. We encourage policymakers to consider collaborative neutrino projects within a broader program
of action toward stability and security on the Korean Peninsula.
Context: Shutdown or repurposing of reactors at Yongbyon
North Korea has built and operated nuclear reactors since the 1960s. As far as public evidence indicates,
all functioning reactors have been at the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center. Plutonium for North Korea’s
nuclear weapons program has come from a 5 MWe (20 MWth)
1 graphite-moderated, gas-cooled, natural
uranium-fueled reactor first operated in 1986.2 Also at Yongbyon is a 100 MWth experimental light water
reactor (ELWR), fueled with low-enriched uranium (LEU)3 and apparently approaching operation.4 Yong-
byon hosts another small research reactor operated intermittently since the 1960s, remnants of a 50 MWe
reactor project decommissioned in the 1990s, facilities for nuclear fuel fabrication and reprocessing, and a
uranium enrichment plant.5
Leaders within and outside North Korea have proposed the retirement of Yongbyon facilities as a move
toward reducing international tensions. The Pyongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018 expresses
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North Korea’s openness to “permanent dismantlement of the nuclear facilities” at Yongbyon in exchange
for U.S. actions.6 U.S. officials voiced support for complete, verified dismantlement.7 An important step in
dismantlement would be shutdown of the reactors. This step would precede removal of reactor buildings by
months to years to allow residual radioactivity to decay. As an alternative or precursor to full dismantlement,
a former U.S. nuclear official has suggested “demilitarization” of Yongbyon.8 Demilitarization could proceed
via cooperative conversion of the reactors from weapons preparation to civilian uses such as power generation
and medical isotope production.
Whatever goal policymakers pursue for Yongbyon, they will seek concrete, objective assurance that agreed
limits are upheld. For reactors, traditional verification protocols involve visual inspections and quantitative
assays of fuel and other materials. Standard measurements include weight checks, analysis with gamma and
neutron detectors, and sample collection for analysis in off-site laboratories. The International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) typically assumes responsibility for these tasks. North Korea has a complicated history with
IAEA inspections, and alternative verification methods that require less site access may be desirable. Satellite
imaging can often show when reactors produce heat. However, emitted heat is only a coarse indicator of the
reactor state and presents little distinction between civilian and military operations. Satellite observation in
the visible and infrared cannot penetrate cloud cover and may miss low-power operations.
Neutrino detectors could complement traditional verification tools in ways that may appeal to all parties.
North Korean officials may be more willing to accept neutrino detectors than standard reactor inspections
because neutrino detectors do not require access inside the reactor buildings, which may have other sensitive
contents. At the same time, the United States and other parties may value the more persistent and specific
information supplied by neutrino detectors, compared to satellite imagery. Both sides may value the oppor-
tunity to work together at Yongbyon on a scientifically advanced project with no historical precedent. In
this way, neutrino detectors could be a low-stakes step toward more comprehensive inspections at Yongbyon,
helping to build trust and lay the groundwork for further cooperative actions. Another option would be to
install one or more neutrino detectors at the time of initial on-site inspections. If follow-up inspections are
delayed due to a subsequent diplomatic setback, the neutrino detectors could continue to provide monitoring
data until on-site inspections resume.
Technical principle: Reactor monitoring with neutrinos
Using neutrinos to remotely monitor reactors was first proposed in 1978 by physicists in the Soviet Union.9
Neutrinos are a byproduct of nuclear fission, arising when neutron-rich fission fragments undergo beta decay.
Because they interact only through the weak force, neutrinos from a reactor core pass through the contain-
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ment building with virtually no attenuation. Roughly 1019 neutrinos per second flow isotropically from a
100 MWth reactor. This flux cannot be altered or contained with shielding.
Neutrino emissions carry information directly from the reactor core in real time. Specifically, neutrino
emissions bear information about the reactor power level and fuel evolution. The connection between neutrino
emission rate and reactor power is simple: both are proportional to the number of fissions occurring in the
core. Beyond that proportionality, the neutrino rate is modulated by the mixture of isotopes undergoing
fission. In a typical reactor, this mixture contains 235U, 239Pu, 238U and 241Pu. The plutonium isotopes,
including weapons-usable 239Pu, come from neutron capture on the uranium fuel. The longer a reactor runs,
and the higher the reactor power, the more plutonium will be produced.
Each fissioning isotope produces neutrinos at a different rate. For example, 239Pu produces about two-
thirds as many neutrinos per fission as 235U. The neutrino energy spectrum also differs between fuel isotopes.
For instance, 239Pu produces a lower-energy neutrino spectrum than 235U. Observing the number and energy
spectrum of neutrinos emitted by a nuclear reactor can therefore reveal the power level and fuel composition
of the reactor. Over several weeks of observation, the power history and fuel evolution can be independently
constrained without access to operational records.10
Physicists have detected neutrinos from reactors for over 60 years. The most accessible detection channel
for reactor neutrinos is inverse beta decay (IBD). In this reaction, a neutrino11 interacts with a hydrogen
nucleus, yielding a positron and neutron. Proton-rich targets, such as water and hydrocarbons, make ideal
detector media. Over decades of neutrino detector evolution, organic scintillators have remained the medium
of choice for detecting IBD because of their good energy resolution and moderate cost. Ongoing R&D may
yield other techniques for observing neutrinos at reactors.12 Here, we focus on IBD in scintillators as an
available, well-demonstrated option.
The world’s first observation of neutrinos occurred at a plutonium production reactor at the U.S. Atomic
Energy Commission’s Savannah River site in the 1950s.13 In the early 2000s, the much larger KamLAND
experiment measured neutrino flavor oscillations from power reactors in Japan, key evidence in establishing
that neutrinos have mass.14 In the mid-2010s, precision neutrino measurements occurred at reactors in
China,15 South Korea,16 and France.17 Recently, searches for sterile neutrinos, a hypothetical particle
beyond the standard model of particle physics, have spurred the development of high-precision, surface-
deployable detectors. These compact, relatively simple detector designs also happen to be ideally suited for
reactor monitoring.
At present, hundreds of neutrinos are detected daily from commercial and research reactors in East Asia,
Europe, and the United States. Over five million reactor neutrino interactions have been recorded and
analyzed to date. Using neutrino data to observe reactor power levels and fuel evolution is now common in
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particle physics experiments, as one step in more complex analyses.18 Since at least the early 2000s, national
and international agencies have recognized the potential to apply this technology to practical problems.19
In the following sections, we present options for using neutrino detectors as verification tools at Yongbyon.
We outline three specific deployment scenarios. The first option is using neutrino detectors to verify that the
5 MWe reactor, ELWR, or both are shut down. The second is using a neutrino detector to verify that the
ELWR is running for the civilian purpose of electricity generation and not for weapons production. Each of
these two options could be realized near the reactor buildings, using demonstrated technology, within about
one year following development of a specific deployment plan. A third option is a larger neutrino detector
which could verify shutdown of both reactors from a distance of up to 1 km.
A possible deployment scenario is sketched in Figure 1. The red and white circles around the 5 MWe
reactor and ELWR correspond to a radius of roughly 50 m. Locations suitable for cooperative deployment
of neutrino detectors appear as near as 20 m from each core, as noted in a previous analysis.20 The purple
enclosure indicates a possibly fenced area; a detector could be deployed outside at a standoff of slightly
over 100 m. The inset at lower right is a concept for a detector and shielding scheme housed in ISO freight
containers, along with a possible mechanism for transporting the detector to the site. The shaded region at
top right indicates where a larger detector in a horizontal tunnel could have an overburden of at least 100 m,
at a standoff of about 800 m (indicated the arrow and arc).
Neutrino-based verification of reactor shutdowns at close range
If the reactors at Yongbyon shut down, neutrino detectors could verify that they remain off during the cool-
down period of months to years preceding full dismantling. To do this, detectors would watch for anomalous
neutrino emission from the cores. Shutdown reactors and spent fuel emit a very low-level neutrino flux due
to the decay of long-lived fission products. This reactor-off neutrino flux typically decays below detection
threshold a few days after shutdown. The neutrino flux from a reactor operating at even low power levels is
much higher than the reactor-off flux. Thus, restart of a reactor registers as a distinct signal in a suitably
sensitive neutrino detector.
Reactor on-off transitions have been observed in neutrino detectors since the 1980s. Physicists in the
Soviet Union pioneered these measurements at the Rovno reactor.21 U.S. physicists explored the idea in
the early 2000s22 and performed a similar experiment at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station.23
Further demonstrations of shutdown/restart observation followed in an applications-oriented experiment in
France,24 as well as basic physics experiments in France,25 China,26 and South Korea.27 One lesson from
this progression is that detector segmentation is key to background rejection, allowing detectors to operate
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Figure 1: Opportunities for neutrino-based verification are highlighted on a satellite image of part of the
Yongyon site; see text for full explanation. Satellite image copyright DigitalGlobe (2018).
on the earth’s surface with essentially no cosmic ray shielding.
Today, a state-of-the-art detector can observe an off-to-on (or on-to-off) reactor transition within hours,
depending on the detector size and reactor proximity. A notable example is the PROSPECT detector
at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, operating with a total mass of 4 tons and less than 1 meter-water-
equivalent overburden.28 In the last two years, the PROSPECT (United States), NEOS (South Korea),29
DANSS (Russia),30 CHANDLER,31 Neutrino-4 (Russia),32 STEREO (France),33 and SoLiδ (Belgium)34
experiments, as well as a detector at the Wylfa reactor (UK),35 have observed differences in neutrino event
rates between reactor-on and reactor-off periods. Some of these experiments have demonstrated steps toward
field readiness, including SoLiδ and the Wylfa detector (now upgraded to the VIDARR project), both
deployed in ISO freight containers, and CHANDLER, deployed in a road-mobile trailer. Collaborations are
also pursuing IBD signals from reactors in Brazil (the Angra detector, collecting data at the power reactor of
the same name),36 Japan (the PANDA experiment, anticipating a deployment at the Ohi power reactor),37
and India (the ISMRAN detector under development at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center).38
Detectors using similar technology could be deployed at Yongbyon. These could verify continuous shut-
down of the 5 MWe reactor, ELWR, or both. At either reactor, the closest conceivable distance for a detector
deployment is about 20 m from the core, as noted in a previous analysis.39 This position would be, especially
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in the case of the 5 MWe reactor, directly outside the reactor building. We envision the detector being
installed outside a reactor which is initially known by all parties to be in the off state and which remains in
the off state for long enough (e.g., a few weeks) for the background rate to be measured. The detector would
then look for an anomalous rise in the data rate. At the ELWR, a 4-ton segmented scintillator detector could
identify an unauthorized start-up of the reactor in at 99% or greater confidence level within one day in 95%
of cases (with the variation arising from statistical variation in the event counts). At the smaller 5 MWe, a
start-up could be detected at 95% or greater confidence level within two weeks in 95% of cases.
These estimates use the measured signal efficiency and background rates of the PROSPECT detector
operating at Oak Ridge and a basic rate-based hypothesis test, as described in the Appendix. In both cases,
the false positive rate from the simple event-count criterion would be about one per year. Examining the
energy spectrum of the events, which differs substantially between background and signal, could eliminate
most false positives. In a real monitoring campaign, spectrum shape and time series information could be
included in the hypothesis test itself. This would likely increase sensitivity beyond the simple estimates here.
The cost of PROSPECT was $5 million, and the detector was constructed in less than one year.
Neutrino-based verification of the reactor core state
As an alternative to a total shutdown of Yongbyon, political leaders may agree to continue operating one or
more reactors there for civilian purposes. For example, they could choose to move forward with operating the
ELWR. This reactor was designed to generate electricity and is not optimal for producing weapons-usable
plutonium.40 However, experts have noted that a modified ELWR could use a different fuel loading and
power profile to enhance plutonium production.41
To verify civilian operations, neutrino detectors could observe both the power profile and fuel evolution
of the ELWR. As noted in the previous section, neutrino-based tracking of reactor power profiles has been
demonstrated in multiple experiments. Neutrino-based tracking of fuel evolution has also been demonstrated.
In particular, neutrino detectors at LEU-fueled light water reactors have observed the characteristic change
from 235U-dominated fissions to a mixture of 235U and bred-in 239Pu fissions.42 These observations used
both neutrino rate and spectral shape information. Using similar techniques, simulations show that neutrino
detectors can distinguish normal, electricity-producing LWR operations from operations designed to produce
weapons-suitable plutonium.43
As a specific example, a neutrino detector outside the Yongbyon ELWR building could check whether the
reactor is using a normal, semi-recycled core or has substituted a fresh core and possibly diverted irradiated
fuel for weapons. A 20-ton detector using existing scintillator technology could identify the diversion of a
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core containing 8 kg of 239Pu (one significant quantity by IAEA definition) in about 200 days. This estimate
assumes the signal efficiency and background levels measured in the PROSPECT detector, as described in
the Appendix. An advantage of neutrino-based core monitoring, compared to other plutonium inventory
approaches, is that it is possible to reconstruct the plutonium content of a reactor even after a pause in data-
taking.44 In this way, a neutrino detector could help to recover from a gap in verification data. Detecting
plutonium diversion from the 5 MWe reactor would take longer, likely beyond a useful timeframe, because
of this reactor’s lower power and because the fission profile evolves less in a graphite reactor than an LWR.
We emphasize that both the shutdown verification option presented in the preceding section and core
monitoring option in this section are achievable with relatively small, surface-deployable systems employing
demonstrated technology. The PROSPECT-like detector suggested in the previous paragraph could be
assembled off-site, inside a standard shipping container, with lead- and water-filled containers providing
adequate cosmic ray shielding. The inset in Figure 1 depicts this concept. On-site infrastructure requirements
and data handling needs would be comparable to that of conventional radiation detection systems.
Neutrino-based verification of reactors over a wider area
So far, we have described options for deploying neutrino detectors within sight of the reactor buildings. These
are attractive options because they allow the detector to remain small and relatively simple to construct.
With the strong caveat that required detector size (or observation time) scales as the square of the standoff
distance, neutrino signals can be detected from farther away.45 Crucial to these observations are very low
background rates. The low background is achieved by locating the detectors underground.
At Yongbyon, it could be feasible to monitor shutdown of both the 5 MWe reactor and ELWR from
a distance of 800–1000 m. This scenario would require a larger detector than the cases discussed in the
previous two sections. A well-demonstrated option is a liquid scintillator detector like those used in the
Daya Bay experiment (site of eight such detectors),46 RENO (two detectors),47 and Double Chooz (two
detectors).48 These detectors require sizable overburden for cosmic ray shielding. The 480 m-high Yaksan
mountain, across the Kuryong river from the Yongbyon reactors, could provide cosmic ray shielding similar
to that of Daya Bay, RENO, and Double Chooz.
In a horizontal tunnel in Yaksan, we estimate that a roughly 30-ton liquid scintillator detector could, in
95% of cases, detect a change of reactor state from on to off at 99% or greater confidence level within 15 days
for the ELWR. Startup of the 5 MWe reactor could be detected at 95% or greater confidence level in at 95%
of cases within approximately 250 days. The time to make 8 kg of plutonium (one significant quantity) in
the 5 MWe reactor is about 400 days. A 250-day warning could be timely by this standard. A roughly 25%
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larger detector would be needed to meet the more stringent standard of detecting a reactor startup within
the time to produce 4 kg of plutonium (about 200 days), which has been estimated as sufficient for a nuclear
weapon.49 In addition to looking for unauthorized startup of the 5 MWe reactor and ELWR, this type of
detector could provide an upper limit on all reactor operations within a radius of 1–2 km. The precise size
and location of the detector could be tailored to suit the specific monitoring goal. Construction time and
cost would be greater than for the options in the previous two sections.
Options for cooperative neutrino science on the Korean Peninsula
Neutrino-based verification could be part of a broader set of actions reintegrating North Korea into the
international community. If carried out cooperatively, neutrino projects could complement wider efforts to
redirect scientists and engineers from the weapons program to peaceful technical work. As we have noted,
neutrino physics as an experimental science originated at a military reactor site with a team of weapons
physicists.50 Workforce reengagement was later a key part of cooperative threat reduction programs in
the former Soviet republics.51 For North Korea, policy experts have again stressed the value of scientific
cooperation to build trust, secure hazardous materials, and help stem the spread of nuclear weapons expertise
to other parties.52 A team of a few dozen scientists and engineers could support a neutrino project at
Yongbyon, split between North Korean and foreign personnel. Like other general-purpose detectors, such as
Geiger counters, neutrino detectors could be built and operated cooperatively without exchange of classified
or weapons-related information. Descriptions of the relevant technology and analyses already appear in
publicly available scientific literature, as we have cited in this document.
Neutrino projects offer a special opportunity to strengthen North-South Korean interactions. South
Korea hosts one of the world’s major reactor neutrino experiments, the Reactor Neutrino Oscillation Experi-
ment (RENO),53 as well as the ongoing Neutrino Experiment for Oscillation at Short baseline (NEOS)54 and
Advanced Molybdenum-based Rare process Experiment (AMoRE).55 Physicists from South Korea collab-
orate extensively on projects beyond their borders, including the upcoming Hyper-Kamiokande experiment
based in Japan and possibly in Korea.56 China is also making major new investments in neutrino physics.
All of these ventures are pushing limits in electronics design and computing algorithms. For North Korea,
participating in international physics collaborations could open the door to valuable scientific and economic
opportunities in and beyond the region.
As a first step, policymakers could agree to involve scientists and engineers from North Korea in neutrino-
based verification projects at Yongbyon. Beyond that, universities and laboratories outside North Korea
could consider student exchanges and visiting professorships in neutrino physics and related areas. Py-
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ongyang’s recently completed Sci-Tech complex could host an international particle physics conference. To
further North-South unity, neutrino detectors at Yongbyon could be twinned with detectors at power reac-
tors in South Korea. This joint program could explore topics in both basic and applied science. On a small
scale, a joint North-South particle physics venture brings to mind the 1954 founding of CERN, one of the
first diplomatic agreements between France, Germany, and neighboring nations following World War II.
In closing, we emphasize that technology and expertise are ready to implement any of the options pre-
sented in this document. Preparation of a detailed construction plan and cost estimate for one or more specific
deployment options could begin immediately. We encourage policymakers to consider neutrino-based options
as part of the broader pursuit of stability and security on the Korean Peninsula.
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Appendix: Basis of estimates
The sensitivity estimates for cases with 20 m baselines come from scaling the observed signal and background
rates of the PROSPECT detector.57 This detector observed 771 signal events per day in 2 tons of fiducial
volume (4 tons total volume). The PROSPECT signal-to-background ratio for IBD-like events is 0.83. The
detector is located at a standoff of 7.9 m from an 85 MWth reactor. Signal and background rates for different
standoffs and reactor powers follow these simple scaling relations:
S = 771
(
m
2 [ton]
)(
P
85 [MWth]
)(
7.9 [m]
L
)2
d−1 ; (1)
B =
771
0.832
(
m
2 [ton]
)
d−1 . (2)
When scaling to detector sizes other than the actual PROSPECT size, we assume that the fiducial volume
is all but the outer, 15-cm-thick layer of the total scintillator volume. In this scaling, a 12-ton fiducial mass
correspond to roughly 20 tons of total scintillator mass.
The sensitivity estimates for the more distantly deployed detector come from scalings similar to Eqs.
1-2. In this case, the reference detector is a Daya Bay near detector in Experimental Hall 1 rather than
PROSPECT.58 The Daya Bay detectors in that location have about 250 m water equivalent overburden,
which corresponds to about 100 m of actual rock overburden. The Daya Bay detectors have 20 tons of
fiducial volume and obtain a signal rate of about 700 events per day and a total background rate of about
12 events per day. The two closest reactors have combined thermal power of 5.8 GWth, and the standoff is
about 400 m. The peak of Yaksan has an elevation of 480 m and is about 2 km from both the 5 MWe and the
ELWR. Locations with 100 m of rock overburden can be found starting at a distance of about 800 m from
the 5 MWe reactor, as shown in Figure 1.
A simple sensitivity metric is the time T required to detect a transition between reactor-off to reactor-on
states at 95% confidence level (CL) or greater, in at least 95% of cases. Using simple counting statistics, the
criterion for detecting at 95% CL a transition from a known background rate B to the signal plus background
rate S +B in time t is: ∫ (S+B)t
−∞
dx f(x|µ = Bt, σ2 = Bt) = 0.95 (3)
where f(x|µ, σ2) is the normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ2. This criterion is met or exceeded
in 95% of cases if the mean expected number of events, equal to (S +B)T , satisfies:
∫ ∞
(S+B)t
dx f(x|µ = (S +B)T, σ2 = (S +B)T ) = 0.95 (4)
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We use Equation 1-4 to estimate the time needed to detect a reactor-off to reactor-on transition, increasing
the standard in Equation 3 to 0.99 where needed to reduce the false positive rate.
For the core state analyses, the reactor core simulation for the ELWR is based on the light-water converted
IR-40 reactor at Arak, Iran, scaled to a reactor power of 100 MWth.
59 The reactor core simulation for the
5 MWe is from a previous analysis of that reactor.
60 The time tSQ to produce 8 kg of plutonium (1 significant
quantity, or SQ, by IAEA definition) is 450 d for the 5 MWe and 330 d for the ELWR. The spectral analysis
techniques are described in a previous work.61 Note that for the 5 MWe, a core swap cannot be detected
even in a zero-background scenario in less than 500 days, which exceeds the time to make 8 kg plutonium in
this reactor.
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